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Abstract
Qualityhumanitarian information is essential for efficient, effective and coordinated
humanitarian responses. During crises, however, humanitarian responders rarely have
access to quality information in order to provide themuchneeded relief in a timely fash-
ion. Traditional methods for the acquisition and evaluation of humanitarian informa-
tion typically confront challenges such as poor accessibility, limited sources, and the
capacity of monitoring and documentation. The more recent emergence of user gen-
erated content from online social platforms addressed some challenges faced by tradi-
tionalmethods, but it also raisedmany concerns regarding information quality and ver-
ifiability, among others, that affect both the public and humanitarian actors. This paper
provides an overview of information verification methods in literature and reviews in-
formation collection and verification practices and tools used by news agencies and hu-
manitarianorganizations. Twenty crowd-sourced informationprojects inhumanitarian
and human rights nature are surveyed. We discuss the findings and give recommenda-
tions for future research.
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1 Introduction
Since the 1950s, the number andmagnitude of disasters have increased exponentially (Özdamar and
Ertem, 2015). About 300 million people on the average are effected annually since the 1990s (ibid.).
Faced with complex humanitarian situations, responders rarely have access to quality information
for decision-making to provide much the needed relief in a timely fashion. Besides the local knowl-
edge, examples of such information include the aid requests of victims, the numbers and locations of
internally displaced persons, the incidents reports, the conditions of essential local infrastructures,
just to name a few. Humanitarian information is valuedas the sine qua non of humanitarian response
(OCHA, 2006), and humanitarian informationmanagement and exchange are the principle source of
situational awareness, crisis decision-making and coordination (Altay and Labonte, 2014).
Traditional methods for the acquisition and evaluation of humanitarian information typically
confront a number of challenges. First, to deliver aid and assistance, humanitarian actors need to
assess the situation and/or to seek representatives of the affected populations for interviews, but the
actors are not alwayspresent in the vicinity of conflict or disaster zones, or have access to those areas.
Second, due to limited resources, accessibility, security and time, it is often very hard if not impossi-
ble to find victims andwitnesses who can and arewilling to provide potentially sensitive information.
Third, humanitarian actors rarely have the capacity to continually monitor and document the inci-
dents over time in the affected areas, and to provide the affected populations timely and effective aid
in return.
In recent humanitarian crises such as the 2010 Haiti earthquake and the 2011 Egyptian revolu-
tion, incorporating humanitarian information from socialmedia andUser Generated Content (UGC)
proved useful when the information was inspected at an aggregated level (Dugdale et al., 2012). Dur-
ing those crises, onlineplatforms suchasTwitter andFacebook facilitated reporting informationmore
efficiently than traditional communication channels (Norheim-Hagtun andMeier, 2010; Hermida et
al., 2014), and addressed some challenges faced by the traditional methods. The information con-
tained in UGC can be vital for effective response (Takahashi et al., 2015), and can be used to boost
the speed and accuracy of relief operations in real-time, and to empower and uplift themorale of the
local populations (Carley et al., 2016; Conrado et al., 2016; Panagiotopoulos et al., 2016; Haworth,
2016). Nevertheless, existing humanitarian information systems using technologies such as social
media and crowd-sourcing have shortcomings including but are not limited to the following (Tapia
et al., 2011; Dugdale et al., 2012; Haworth, 2016; Conrado et al., 2016; Anson et al., 2017):
1. The systems are not effective in collecting relevant and quality information. While there is
informationoverloadandprocessingdifficulties, there is also ahigh risk of receiving inaccurate
and incorrect information (including that frommalicious users).
2. There is no or limited evaluation of the reliability of the sources and the credibility of the infor-
mation, making humanitarian actors and affected communities vulnerable to inaccurate and
incorrect information.
3. The contributed informationhas largely beendeemedasunverifiable anduntrustworthy. Thus
it is construed as unsuitable to incorporate into establishedmechanisms for decision-making.
4. There is a lack of feedback loops and empowerment of those (often the affected populations)
who contributed the information, partly due to the above shortcomings.
Thequality of information fromUGC is amajor challenge that affects both thepublic andhuman-
itarian actors (Haworth, 2016). The vast volume of UGC circulating in social media contains relevant
and useful information, which is potentially life-saving, but it also contains floods of irrelevancy, in-
accuracy and rumours (Anson et al., 2017). For these reasons, although there have been needs and
interests from the humanitarian actors and local communities in the field to establish (effective and
reliable) information exchange, many humanitarian actors are sceptical about the levels of reliabil-
ity of self-reported information since the information is often unverifiable (Altay and Labonte, 2014;
Conrado et al., 2016).
How to detect relevant humanitarian information and verify the information in an effective and
efficientmanner is the concernof this paper. In the following,wefirst provide anoverviewof informa-
tion verification methods in literature, then review information collection and verification practices
and tools used by news organizations and humanitarian organizations. We end with a discussion of
the findings and recommendations for future research.
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2 An Overview of Information VerificationMethods
In literature, some researchersmake no distinction between data (quality) and information (quality)
(e.g., Wand and Wang, 1996; Pipino et al., 2002; Loshin, 2011) while some others see the difference
as being crucial (e.g., Ackoff, 1989; Lillrank, 2003; Price and Shanks, 2005). The definitions of data
or information quality in literature are also equivocal. In this paper, information quality refers to
the semantic and pragmatic clarity of UGC rather than its syntactic clarity (Huang, 2013). Important
dimensions of information quality include relevance, accuracy, volume, completeness, timeliness,
reliability and verifiability (Shanteau, 1992; Yildiz, 2015; Shamala et al., 2017). In relation to those, ve-
racity can be defined as the combination of how accurate, complete, reliable and timely the informa-
tion in question is (Lin et al., 2016). Veracity can also include trustworthiness which is an aggregated
dimension determined by the data origins (or the sources), and the data collection and processing
methods (ibid.).
Information detection and verification are often researched in the context of investigative jour-
nalism and (business, police, civilian ormilitary) intelligence, and inmore general applications. Four
major types of (not necessarily mutually exclusive) (text-based) information detection and verifica-
tionmethods can be identified in literature: 1) cross-validation, 2) expert opinion, 3) crowd-sourcing,
and 4) machine learning; see Table 1.
Cross-validation a.k.a. triangulation, of independent data sources is the process where humanitar-
ian actors utilize additional information to validate the veracity of given information extracted
from UGC (Crowley et al., 2013). A major limitation is the required manual input of users for
validation. Its effectiveness is directly and entirely dependent on the skill and ability of the
users (Daume et al., 2014).
Expert opinion is the process where experts or people of authority utilize their expertise or author-
itative sources to validate the veracity of information (Martin, 2016). This type of methods is
limited by the availability of experts in the field (ibid.). Similar to cross-validation, it often re-
quires extensive manual input, and the knowledge, skill and network of the users (ibid.).
Crowd-sourcing is the use of Internet platforms in combination with the input of social media in
order to validate the veracity of information harnessed from UGC (Riccardi, 2016). The users
verify whether the given information is of good quality. This requires a large number of users
to determine the veracity of the information (a.k.a the wisdom of the masses, or collective in-
telligence) (Howe, 2008; Basu et al., 2016).
Machine learning is the technology of getting computer systems to act without being explicitly pro-
grammed (Michalski et al., 2013), achieved through automated statistical methods (Alpaydin,
2014). Machine learning is applied in many fields such as voice and image recognition, finan-
cial predictions, information verification and many other fields. Decision makers in the hu-
manitarian domain are still hesitant to use such methods due to the uncertain accuracy and
poor understandability (Altay and Labonte, 2014; Conrado et al., 2016).
In addition, all the abovemethods do not explicitly and effectively detect malicious uses and ru-
mours along the detection and verification of relevant information. Malicious uses and rumours are
sources of instability during relief operations (Conrado et al., 2016; Riccardi, 2016). They can disrupt
the flow of humanitarian operations (Haworth, 2016). For example, terrorists and kidnappers, and
sometimes even the affected communities, media and humanitarian actors might publish false or
unverified information (Altay and Labonte, 2014; Riccardi, 2016). The abuse and misuse of informa-
tion can create additional conflict and problems, and possibly put people in danger and jeopardize
the success of the relief operation (Riccardi, 2016).
3 Information Verification in News Organizations
Somenews agencies (particularly investigative journalists) andhumanitarian actors lately started us-
ing information verification tools for UGC due to the emergence of new media (Brandtzaeg et al.,
2016; Altay and Labonte, 2014):
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Method Limitation Reference
Cross-
validation
• Restricted by the required user input
• Directly and entirely dependent on users’
skill and ability
• No or poor detection of malicious users
and rumours
Crowley et al. (2013)
Daume et al. (2014)
Expert Opin-
ion
• Limited availability of experts
• Restricted by the required user input
• Dependent on users’ knowledge, skill and
network
• No or poor detection of malicious users
and rumours
Martin (2016)
Crowd-
sourcing
• Requires a great number of users
• Restricted by the required user input
• No or poor detection of malicious users
and rumours
Basu et al. (2016)
Callaghan (2016)
Gao et al. (2011)
Ludwig et al. (2017)
Meier (2011)
Riccardi (2016)
Soden and Palen (2014)
Yuan and Liu (2018)
Machine
Learning
• Needs good training data
• Uncertain accuracy rates
• Hard to obtain trust from users because of
its untransparent inner working
• No or poor detection of malicious users
and rumours
Ali et al. (2017)
Carley et al. (2016)
Castillo et al. (2013)
Diakopoulos et al. (2012)
Hung et al. (2016)
Kang et al. (2012)
Liu et al. (2016)
Özdamar and Ertem (2015)
Spence et al. (2016)
Table 1: Four major types of information detection and verification methods (Vaporidis,
2019)
• News organizations traditionally focuses on “breaking news”. Some now focus more on being
the best at verifying and curating the information (Newman, 2009).
• Established humanitarian actors traditionally operate with centralized command structures,
standardoperating procedures, and internal vetting standards to ensure the flow, accuracyand
verification of information. With the current expectation of speed and efficiency, there are
transitions toward harvesting UGC in combination with verification (Coyle and Meier, 2009;
Tapia et al., 2011; Walton et al., 2011).
In the following, we review the verification practices and tools reported in literature. “Practices”
refers to the information verification processes, methods and techniques through which the content
is verified. “Tools” are for instance the computerized or manual checklists, and software platforms
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that facilitate the verification.
Established news agencies have their own verification practices, or outsource the verification of
sources to other companies (Hermida et al., 2014; Schifferes et al., 2014). There are three common
practices (Bruno, 2011):
1. The centralized approach, that tries to verify information within one’s own organization.
2. The decentralized approach, that tries to incorporate the crowd in verification through live
blogging or streaming.
3. The community-basedapproach,which tries to create aplatform for verification throughcrowd-
sourcing.
For example, theBBC created its centralizedUGCHub in 2005, TheGuardian has its decentralized
verification platform, and the CNN has its community-based iReport launched in 2006 (ibid.). At the
UGCHub of BBC, potentially valuablephotos, texts and emails are verified before they are published.
This is done centrally at the BBC news room, by calling the contributor personally, when possible,
and asking basic questions regarding the authenticity of the content (Harrison, 2010). The content is
subsequently verified by cross-validation (Popoola et al., 2013). For photographs, the precise place
and time of the photos are important factors for verification. They are compared and verified with
the statement of the source (Bruno, 2011). The UGC Hub uses four metrics to verify the credibility
of Twitter accounts (Popoola et al., 2013): (1) the number of Twitter followers an account has; (2) is
the account followed by an reputable source? (3) previous posts by the account; and (4) how long the
account hasbeen active for? For emails the IP addresses are checked, and for phone calls, the number
prefix. Nonetheless, reaching out to the sources in person remains the most important verification
method at the BBC UGC Hub (Bruno, 2011). At CNN, a different approach is used focusing on the
online community of contributors. The information posted on iReport is not checked prior to publi-
cation, but can be verified by other users afterwards. Readers can recognize verified stories by badges
given when the stories are verified by other users (ibid.).
Another example of community-based approach is the U-Shahid project. It is launched by an
Egyptian groupbased inCairoworkedwith a journalist fromThomsonReuters. The project developed
a checklist during the 2011 Egyptian crisis, with four principles for the verification of sources (Meier,
2015): (1) unknown sources are called back when possible. The source is asked if he or she was an
eyewitness, or if more information can be provided; (2) a trusted source in the area is contacted for
verificationwhen possible, and trustedNGOworkers are contacted; (3) online research is performed,
to look for similar videos, photographs and blog posts; and (4) cross-validation of information with
reports received.
During the Arab spring, Andy Carvin, a journalist ofNational Public Radio (NPR), asked his Twit-
ter followers to verify reports (Hermida et al., 2014; Meier, 2015). He received news, and verified it
by retweeting it and asked for eyewitnesses and sources. They helped him translate, cross-validate
and track down the key information (Silverman, 2014). Unreliable sources were dropped and reliable
accounts were saved (Hermida et al., 2014).
News agencies suchasAl Jazeera,TheNewYorkTimes andTheWall Street Journalhaveoutsourced
the verification of photo and video content to Storyful, a company founded in 2010 and bought over
by News Corp for $25 million in 2013 (Hermida, 2015). Storyful verifies Twitter sources by looking at:
(1) the time of day of posts; (2) the weather in the content versus the actual weather reports; (3) the
accents spoken in video content; and (4) the landmarks which can be confirmed by other sources
(Popoola et al., 2013).
There are a few other tools developed for information verification used by journalists. For exam-
ple, Tweetdeck is a tool for checking, and screening Twitter posts, also used by media organizations
(Sump-Crethar, 2012). The Reuters created its own computerized tool for verifying real-time news
events onTwitter. All its event processing is computerized, andmachine learning is used to verify fake
news Tweets (Liu et al., 2016). Besides those, tools such as TinEye andGoogle reverse image search are
also used for the verification of photos (Pantti and Siren, 2015). The EU Social Sensor project aims
at creating groups of reliable Twitter users to verify posts and accounts, and designing a new tool to
search across socialmedia for news stories, surface trends, andhelpwith verification (Schifferes et al.,
2014).
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4 Information Verification in HumanitarianOrganizations
The basis of information verification by humanitarian organizations lies in the principles ofHumani-
tarian InformationManagement and Exchangeendorsed byOCHA (UnitedNationsOffice for theCo-
ordination of Humanitarian Affairs) and many other humanitarian actors (Van de Walle et al., 2008).
One of the principles – verifiability – stresses the ability to ensure that information represents what it
supposed to represent and themethodologies to validate information are sound; another principle –
reliability – stresses the credibility of the source and themethod of collection.
Theverification of information fromUGC in humanitarian situations can take an intrinsic and/or
extrinsic approach (Conrado et al., 2016). With an intrinsic approach, the validity of the content,
context and the contributor themselves (i.e. the intrinsic properties) are researched. With an extrinsic
approach, additional resources to validate the information (i.e. the extrinsic properties) are searched,
e.g., experts, crowd-souring and linked data (ibid.).
The idea behind crowd-sourcing is that although “truth” is uncertain, with enough volume, a
“truth” emerges that diminishes false reports (Okolloh, 2009). Four elements can be checked to con-
firm crowd-sourced information in humanitarian context: 1) Provenance: confirm the authenticity
of the piece of information. Is this the original piece of content? 2) Source: confirm the source. Who
uploaded the content? 3) Date: confirm the date of the event and the time of the content. When was
the content created? 4) Location: confirm the geolocation. Where was the content created? (Wardle,
2014).
In the aftermath of the 2010 Haiti earthquake, UGC contributed to humanitarian responses. It is
ledby theUshahidiplatformand streetmappingplatforms suchas theHumanitarianOpenStreetMap
Team (HOT) (Soden and Palen, 2014). These platforms were used because traditional information
gathering in humanitarian organizations were not designed to integrate intelligence from local com-
munities, and individual communications of the Haitians were lost (Heinzelman and Waters, 2010).
A challenge during the Haiti earthquake response was to make a reliable crisis map of the affected
area for humanitarian actors to focus their relief efforts on (Meier, 2011). Ushahidi-Haiti provided
crisis mapping created by a team of volunteers based on reports received via Twitter, email, SMS and
other sources (Norheim-Hagtun andMeier, 2010). Information verification at the Ushahidi platform
can be performed in two ways. On the site of Ushahidi, there is a verification button that allows the
crowd to verify the content of the crisesmap (Gao et al., 2011). But generally only a few people served
as verifiers across Ushahidi map cases (ibid.). The second way is to manually check the reports by
Ushahidi staffs. The approval processwas rather ad hoc1 which is a risk with any crowd-sourcing tool
(Okolloh, 2009).
Verily is a platformdesigned for rapid collection and assessmentof information generated during
natural disasters (Popoola et al., 2013). The departure point is the posting of a verification request,
structuredas a yes/noevent-basedquestion, e.g., “Is theBrooklynbridgedamaged in the storm?” The
request shall trigger the collection of evidence to assess, through evaluation of collected evidence,
whether a given event has actually happened. There are also initiatives that aim to create networks
of volunteers worldwide to help verify humanitarian information during crises, and to create Cri-
sis Maps, e.g. CrisisCommons, CrisisMappers, Standby Task Force, Humanity Road (Ziemke, 2012;
Rogstadius et al., 2013; Cobb et al., 2014; Norris, 2017).
Table 2 provides a list of projects that use crowd-sourcing to acquire information in humanitarian
andhumanrights nature2. Our research shows thatmany crowd-sourcingprojects donot inform their
sources of the risks entailed with reporting potentially sensitive information using media that can be
traced or channels that can be intercepted. Rarely precautions are taken to secure collected data, in
1“Where possible, we called or emailed reporters to try to verify reports. Where people reported anonymously,
stories were counter-checked by comparing with other sources e.g. mainstream media. Where information ap-
peared credible but we could not verify it, we posted it and noted that it was not verified” (Okolloh, 2009).
2We used largely publicly available information e.g. organizations’ websites and publications, traditional and
social media articles such as newspapers and blogs, as well as academic literature. Interviews were conducted per
phone or internet video call with: OCHA / Libya Crisis Map, Harassmap Egypt, Front for the Defence of Egyptian
Protester, Resolve / LRA Crisis Tracker, Safecity India, Agresiones contra periodistas y blogueros en Mexico, and
Women’s refugee commission /Watchlist on Children.
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particular sensitive information such as biographic information. In fact, many projects seem to be
either unaware of these challenges or when aware they appear ill-equipped to tackle them.
From a technological point of view, Ushahidi stands out as the most used crowd-sourcing plat-
form in the humanitarian domain. The platform is often deployed without or with minimal cus-
tomization unless run by professionals. The project teams often lack the necessary resources to use
the platform to its full capacity or integrate it with other technologies such as SMS gateways and ag-
gregatorsor Interactive VoiceResponsesystems. The teamsusually settlewith theoutof the box func-
tionalities without considering which ones need to be deployed to address the needs of the users. For
example, for some NGOs, Internet communication security policies prevented access to Ushahidi’s
website during the Haiti crisis response (Altay and Labonte, 2014). Inmany cases, the dynamic event
data aggregated could not be fully integrated into coordination mechanisms because it did not align
with the specific information requirements of the organisations including large NGOs and the UN
(Nelson et al., 2010; Morrow et al., 2011; Altay and Labonte, 2014).
A few projects stand out for their professional and innovative approaches. The LRA CrisisTracker
project is taking security very seriously and developeda complete codebook to ensure high data qual-
ity. It is the only project uncovered insofar that has a methodology in place to assess the veracity of
the information gathered. Facing the samechallenges aswithmanyother projects, it does fall short in
terms of sourcing and does not record enough information to allow for an unbroken chain of custody.
Digital Democracy’s EmpoweringWomen in Haiti has developed robust feedback loops allowing vic-
tims of sexual or gender based violence to seek assistance. The Front to Defend Egyptian Protesters
uses a variety of tactics, including crowd-sourcing of information when appropriate. From all the
projects reviewed it is the only one that proactively works with lawyers who systematically and per-
sonally verify reported information and follow case files of detained protesters.
In terms of innovation, some developments took place in the sphere of semantic analysis and
machine learning with projects such as Syria CrisisTracker, which tried to make sense of publicly
available information from the media with the help of algorithms that seek to automatically assess
the relevance of published information, clustering these along known topical issues. Other projects
which were still on the test bed also showed interesting promises, such as the Standby Task Force
aimed to micro-task the analysis of a large piece of satellite imagery in Somalia to help the UN as-
sess the number of displaced persons in a given area. Although these attempts showed shortcomings
and needed to be further professionalized, the ideas and concepts that drive them show a promising
future if properly used.
5 Discussion and Future Research
Information verification is traditionally important and challenging. It becomes even more so with
the emergence of new technologies such as social media and crowd-sourcing. Due to different tra-
ditions, the news and humanitarian organizations have different practices and use different means
for information gathering and verification. Both domains could learn from each other’s experiences.
Although with varied focuses, both tend to expand information verification from a centralized in-
ternal approach towards a more community-based external approach, where the content, context
and sources are checked by means of e.g. crowd-sourcing and micro-tasking instead of only by the
organizations themselves. This trend is not without consequences, however. Engaged citizens and
volunteers who use crowd-sourcing to report incidents and document events, as well as the organi-
zations that deploy crowd-sourcing platformsmay come unprepared and inexperienced to the tasks.
The potential privacy, safety and security risks and challenges can be overlooked both by the con-
tributors and the organizations. Even when there is awareness, those issues are often challenging to
tackle given the time and resources available.
Beyondwarrantedprivacy, safety and security concerns, the informationgathered is often incom-
plete and is of limited use beyond advocacy. In general, information verification is lacking. The basic
5W1H questions (when, where, who did what, why and how) are rarely answered. Many projects de-
veloped their own taxonomies that are not well defined, leaving their sources or thosemanually pro-
cessing the information guessing what each category refers to. As categories do not alignwith known
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Table 2: Crowd-sourcing projects in humanitarian and human rights nature
Platfrom and Description
Technology
Used
AFRICA
Libya Crisis Map (Libya)
Early March 2011, OCHA activated the Standby Volunteer Task Force (SBTF), a group of
volunteers with various field of expertise, to create the Libya Crisis Map to help provide
better situational awareness about the situation unfolding on the ground. The UN had no
access to the country and OCHA did not have the resources to gather, verify and process the
amount of online available information. The website was made available to organizations
responding to the Libya crisis with the intention to provide them information that may assist
in improving their operational planning. In April 2011 the SBTF handed over the map to
OCHAwhich maintained it with a group of volunteers until 4 June 2011.
Ushahidi, Skype
incl. instant
messenger,
Google Docs,
Google Groups
The Front to Defend Egypt Protesters (FDEP) (Egypt)
Early April 2010, some 34 NGOs in Egypt setup the FDEP to provide legal and informative
support to participants to peaceful demonstrations; provide coordinated response to
random andmass arrest by the police as well as detention and inhumane treatment of
protesters and detainees; and help coordinate efforts and work by human rights groups and
lawyers towards their release. By 2011 FDEP’s mandate expanded to cover a total of 8
governorates and provide legal support to those tried by military courts. To reach this
objective, the FDEP set up several hotlines used by activists to report via SMS or calls about
arrest, detentions, injuries and the need for lawyers. Protesters facing arrest were given the
possibility to SMS their full name, age, ID, health status, time and location of detention.
Upon reception of such information FDEP lawyers would go to police stations and other
possible places of detentions close to the area of the demonstration to insure that those
arrested do not face torture or violence and assist the interrogation process. Lawyers also
update a FDEP communication team with the status of the prisoners allowing a medical
team to try to gain access in case protesters are injured and a provision committee to provide
food, drinks, medication and other necessity. After verification of the information the
communication team would post the name of the detainees and their location of detention
on the FDEP blog allowing families and relatives to call and provide additional information.
The communication team also post media reports in Flickr and Youtube platforms and
initiated a Twitter hashtag (#EgyDefense) to tweet immediate news.
Telephone
hotlines, SMS,
Twitter, Flickr,
Youtube, Blogs,
Google maps,
Google Drive,
RSS feeds
Harass map (Egypt and several countries in the world)
Harassmap was launched in December 2010 by four volunteers using Ushahidi and
FrontlineSMS “with the mission to end the social acceptability of sexual harassment and
assault in Egypt”. By means of online andmobile technology, mass media and
communications campaigns Harassmap support an on-the-ground mobilization efforts by
700 volunteers spread accross 15 governorates in Egypt focused on changing perceptions so
that people start seeing sexual harassment and assault as the crime it actually is and start
standing up to it before and when they see it happen. The end goal is to restore a sense of
social responsibility andmake all of Egypt a “Safe Zone”.
Ushahidi,
FrontlineSMS,
Twitter,
Facebook, email
Speak-to-Tweet (Egypt, Syria)
A joint project by Google and Twitter that in case of Internet blackouts like the one
experienced in Egypt begin 2011 andmore recently in Syria end 2012 allows users to get their
voices heard by calling designated phone numbers and leave a voice message which is
automatically tweeted with the hashtag of the country of origin of the call, without the need
for an Internet connection.
Twitter,
Telephones,
Google docs
UN (Somalia and Syria)
The United Nations reportedly approached the Standby Task Force (SBTF) to pilot the
crowd-sourcing of the satellite imagery analysis of a stretch of Somalian territory to tag the
possible location of shelters. No operational purposes. Test only.
Tommod,
Ushahidi
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Table 2: Crowd-sourcing projects in humanitarian and human rights nature
Platfrom and Description
Technology
Used
AFRICA
Voix des Kivus (Democratic Republic of the Congo)
The objective of this Columbia University project was to examine the potential for using SMS
technology to gather conflict event data in real-time using a “crowd-seeding” approach
instead of a crowd-sourcing approach. Using standard principles of survey research and
statistical analysis, 18 sites in the province of South Kivu were sampled. In each site 3 trusted
reporters were identified, trained and provided with a mobile phone and reporting
instructions. Only they could contribute reports, rather than the crowd with a mobile phone
or connection of some sort, as it the case with standard crowd-sourcing platforms.
FrontlineSMS,
R, LaTeX
LRACrisis Tracker (CAR, DRC, South Sudan)
Gather information about the Lord?s Resistance Armymovements and attacks from a local
early-warning radio network supported by Invisible Children in addition to data sourced
from the United Nations, local Non-Government Organizations, and first-hand research to
improve efforts to combat LRA atrocities and help communities in need. To achieve these
objectives, Invisible Children deployed HF radios in several location across northern D.R.
Congo and larger towns in eastern Central African Republic (CAR) as well as satellite phones
to local security committees in more remote and less restive locations in eastern CAR. In
Southern Sudan, existing HF radios are informally “plugged in” into Invisible Children’ radio
network. Local security committees gather information about LRA activities and related
security incidents from a variety of local sources, both direct and indirect, and transmit them
via the HF network or satellite phones to Invisible Children team based in Dungu, D.R.
Congo. The Invisible Children staff in Dungu also participate in weekly OCHA led protection
cluster as well as the MONUSCO led Joint Information Operation Cell (JIOC)meetings with
other humanitarian actors active in the area whomay share information about LRA
activities. The collected information is putted into a customized version of the Salesforce
customer relationship platform which is ultimately analysed by Resolve analysts who
produce regular security briefs. Simultaneously, information about LRA activities for which
there is a reasonable doubt that they occurred are published via an interactive map on the
LRA Crisis Tracker website.
HF Radios,
satellite phones,
cloud based
Salesforce
platform
Hatari (Kenya)
Allow Nairobi residents to report incidents of crime and corruption in their own voices by
SMS, Twitter, smartphone app, email or via the website.
Ushahidi,
Frontline SMS,
Twitter, Email
Table 2: Crowd-sourcing projects in humanitarian and human rights nature
Platfrom and Description
Technology
Used
MIDDLE-EAST
Syria Tracker (Syria)
A crowdsourcing effort that has been collecting citizen reports on human rights violations
and casualties in Syria, since April 2011 which goals are to provide the number of the
fatalities and preserve the name, location and details of each victim. Whenever possible,
each name is linked to a photo or video of each casualty. Syria Tracker provides: A
continually updated list of eye witness reports from within Syria, often accompanied by
media links; aggregate reports including analysis and visualizations of deaths and atrocities
in Syria and a stream of content-filtered media from news, social media (Twitter and
Facebook) and official sources.
Ushahidi,
HealthMap
platform, Crisis
Tracker
platform,
Twitter,
Facebook,
Speak-to-Tweet
Women under siege (Syria)
Document andmap reports of sexual violence in the context of the Syrian conflict discover
whether rape and sexual assault are widespread–such evidence can be used to aid the
international community in grasping the urgency of what is happening in Syria, and can
provide the base for potential future prosecutions.
Ushahidi, email,
Twitter, app
Middle East Domestic Help Abuse Reporting (Middle-East)
Allow human rights organizations, concerned citizens andmigrant workers victims of
domestic abuse to report alleged incident of abuses to palliate to the lack of a centralised
source for data about abuses against migrant workers.
Ushahidi
crowdmap,
email, Twitter,
SMS
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Table 2: Crowd-sourcing projects in humanitarian and human rights nature
Platfrom and Description
Technology
Used
AMERICA
Hollaback (USA and several countries in the world)
Expose street harassers by documenting, mapping and sharing incidents of street
harassment by means of a smart phone application.
Hollaback app,
Google maps
Digital Democracy – Empowering women inHaiti (Haiti)
Assist gender-based violence victims and empower women in general in Haiti by means of
technology and grass-root activities.
Noula (an
Ushahidi like
platform)
#PorTodosLosDesaparecidos (Central America)
To record the 27 thousandmissing that the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) has
registered in view of facilitating a direct contact between the victims, citizens, family and the
media.
Crowdmap,
Twitter,
Smartphone
app, Emails
Agresiones contra periodistas y blogueros enMÃl’xico (Mexico)
Joint programme of Freedom House, the International Centre for journalists andMi Mexico
to record andmap incidents of attacks against journalists, bloggers and citizen reporters in
Mexico.
Crowdmap,
Smartphone
app, Twitter,
Emails,
telephone
Retio (Mexico)
Crowdsource citizen reports via Twitter about any danger or problems in their areas,
including activities of security forces. These reports are recorded in a database and
published online to allow users to better understand their environment and let the
authorities know that their actions are being monitored with the hope that it will inhibit
extortion, arbitrary detention, abuse of authority and police brutality
Retio, Twitter
ASIA
Women Empowerment for Social Change Program (Cambodia)
Map reported incidents of gender based violence in Cambodia to offers both government
officials, key stakeholders and the public the opportunity to track incidences of gender
based violence online to increase awareness and work toward immediate intervention and
prevention methods.
Ushahidi
Safecity India (India)
Safecity is an information aggregation platform for victims and witnesses of sexual
harassment to report harassment of a sexual nature and help identifying locations where
these occurred. The final objective of Safecity is not so much recording information to seek
redress for the victims f sexual harassment, but is mainly preventive by highlighting a serious
social issue to change the way our society thinks and reacts about sexual harassment, which
in time will hopefully lead to a safe and non-violent environment for all.
Ushahidi,
Twitter, Email,
smart phone
app, Interactive
Voice Response
system
EUROPE
Rate your Rights Serbia (Serbia)
An UNDP/UNHCHR initiative in partnership with the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights
andmedia outlet b92 to crowdsource answers to a questionnaire on the state of human
rights in Serbia in the context of the Universal Periodic review and at a later stage to
comment on the answers given by the State of Serbia to the same questionnaire.
Internet based
questionnaire
Istanbul Violence (Turkey)
Map violence during the June 2013 demonstrations that erupted in Taksim square and
spread to other towns across Turkey.
Ushahidi
crowd-map,
Twitter, emails,
app
International Humanitarian Law and human rights categories, the data gathered could not be eas-
ily used or compared unless being recoded. The quality of the verification procedures, if any, varied
largely. Some projects did not attempt to verify the information gathered and published, other ap-
plied simplistic methods. For example if the information has been reported by a traditional media it
was deemed verified. Some tried to cross-validate the information gathered but did not document or
publish their methodologies. Combined with the frequent lack of information verification, the lack
of source evaluation rendered many projects permeable to disinformation attempts which beyond
affecting the credibility of the projects could also have real-life effects.
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In terms of scalability and empowerment, many projects which are not run by professionals or
supported by established organizations do not adopt a human centred design process when design-
ing and deploying crowd-sourcing technologies; consider desired impact and outcomes, inputs and
outputs. Someprojects have a pre-determined idea ofwhat couldor shouldbe done and hope that by
deploying a crowd-sourcing platform people will start reporting information relevant to the project
goal. Communication cultures (e.g. prominent use of text or voice) or the level of literacy of the
targeted users is rarely taken into consideration. Sensitization efforts around the project are often
minimal, relying too often on existing social media channels that are only accessible to a (computer)
literate audience. At times, the sole objective is the collection and publication of information, with-
out further use expected. The flow of information remains unidirectional, with no feedback loops
that could stimulate the empowerment of the sources and users of the information. The success of
such endeavours remain limited, with the crowd-sourcing nature of several projects relying on a few
devoted volunteers.
To tackle these challenges, we propose the following research agenda for future work. First, the
state of the art in the domain of (business, police, civilian andmilitary) intelligence shall be surveyed.
There is a rich body of knowledge related to information collection and verification in this domain.
Limited by time and resources, this project only surveyed and reported on the state of the art in inves-
tigative journalism and humanitarian information systems. Interesting research questions include:
Can the methodologies and technologies for information collection and verification from investiga-
tive journalism and (business, police, civilian and military) intelligence add value to the humanitar-
ian domain? To what extend can those methodologies and technologies be reused and adapted to
improve the quality of humanitarian information and meet the needs of crisis decision-making and
coordination?
Second, with respect to information quality for humanitarian responses, clear operational guide-
lines shall be defined for the desired information quality dimensions, and how to assist achieving the
information quality goals during the preparation and information collection stages as well as later
stages, regardless whether the information is being crowed-sourced or not. Although there exists a
set of humanitarian information management principles3, defining concrete operational guidelines
that can be integrated or tailored to the existing practices ofmajor humanitarian actors, is essential to
help achieve those goals. Interesting research questions include: How to operationalise the humani-
tarian information management principles? How to refine or translate those principles into measur-
able information quality dimensions and metrics so that humantarian actors have well-defined and
implementable standards and guidelines to improve information quality during the preparation, in-
formation collection and verification stages?
Third, in the humanitariandomain, resource intensiveness in terms ofmanpowerand time, com-
bined with the complexity of the tasks, are serious impediments to collecting good quality informa-
tion and to information verification. There have been a number of initiatives and projects that aim
to use technology to facilitate those tasks, but the processes and platforms that could effectively and
efficiently address the complexity of those tasks are not yet mature. There is an urgent need for tech-
nological innovation and breakthrough in the humanitarian domain, but the difficulties and chal-
lenges reside not in the technological side or the socio-political side alone but in the combination
and dynamics of both. Simply put, the best piece of technology will not be practically useful, espe-
cially in crisis situations, if there is a lack of sufficient consideration for privacy, safety and security
by design, or if other socio-political context and important values are not taken into careful consid-
eration. With respect to the socio-technical nature of humanitarian information systems, interesting
research questions include: How to facilitate humanitarian actors to detect and collect relevant in-
formation and verify the information using emerging technologies such as smart analytics, machines
learning, crowd-sourcing and micro tasking? How can such technologies be designed to empower
the humanitarian actors and the affected communities alike in a scalable and sustainable manner?
To summarize, using emerging technologies such as crowd-sourcing and machine learning for
information collection and verification is still in its infancy and shows many limitations. There are
3Theses are: Accessibility, Inclusiveness, Inter-operability, Accountability, Verifiability, Relevance, Impartiality,
Humanity, Timeliness, Sustainability, Reliability, Reciprocity and Confidentiality (Van de Walle et al., 2008).
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many challenges ahead calling for research and innovation. Many projects surveyed by this work
lackedmethodologies and relied heavily on human input for documentation and analysis. Recorded
information lacked quality, and taxonomies differed between projects. Methodological standards
appeared non-existent. Source evaluation as well as cross-validation was a seldom phenomenon
and could be improved when present. Privacy, safety and security safeguards were rare. Save when
projects were accompanied by grass-root activities, feedback loops to affected communities or infor-
mation contributors had seldom been put in place, restricting empowerment opportunities. Often
communication channels required users to have access to the Internet, which limited the user base
to amore educated and resourceful crowd, and inhibited the participation and empowerment of less
educated and disadvantaged crowds. Unless when the project are run by professionals, project ini-
tiators developed few synergies and partnerships with likewise projects and other concerned actors.
More coordination, collaboration and knowledge sharing is needed in future projects.
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